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Karl Figlio
Psychoanalysis, Reparation, and  
Historical Memory
Introduction: Psychoanalysts and Historians
in this paper, i will argue that remembering is a form of 
reparation and that there is a traduced form of remembering-as-
manic-reparation.1 They look the same, but reparation is based 
on concern for damage to the other, while manic reparation 
is based on narcissistic aggrandizement and contempt for the 
other. remembering as reparation includes an awareness of 
an attack upon an object, which drives a reparative process. By 
contrast, remembering as manic reparation controls memory, 
one form of which is to recast it into a defensive, narcissistic 
memory organization.
reparation is driven by guilt. To remember as reparation 
is to suffer guilt. it is also to be drawn into falsifying memory 
in order to avoid guilt: reparation can then take on a manic 
reparative coloring and symbols of reparation can become am-
biguous as they become foci for different, conflicting groups. 
They can become enclaves of memories that differ from each 
other and depend on these differences. Each enclave can re-
member in its own way because another remembers differently, 
at the expense of a convergent memory. Symbols of remember-
ing, such as memorials, are sites of ambivalence, representing 
both reparative and manic-reparative intentions, as well as 
intellectual, emotional, and political conflict.
i will address the problem of remembering and repairing 
through an analysis of ambivalence in german memory of the 
Nazi period, which is expressed through reparation distorted 
by its apparent near-kin, manic reparation. Sites of remember-
ing portray this ambivalent reparative intention and gather 
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conflicting views and factions around them. To make this case, 
i will clarify the concepts of reparation, manic reparation, in-
trojective identification, and projective identification. i align 
reparation with introjective identification and manic reparation 
with projective identification.
germany after 1945 has struggled to assimilate this past, 
along with the guilt of the perpetrator, into its collective 
memory. The so called Historikerstreit, or historian’s struggle, 
over national history, identity, and pride in post-Holocaust 
germany, was a public debate over whether it could bear the 
burden of the past and integrate the Nazi period into its col-
lective memory, or whether it had to fall into isolated enclaves 
of distorted memory, which avoided this heavy weight of re-
sponsibility (Figlio, 2011; Maier, 1988, pp. 9–16, 50-61, 90; for 
documentation, see Knowlton & Cates, 1993). it was precipi-
tated by U.S. President ronald reagan’s visit, arranged with the 
conservative Chancellor Helmut Kohl, to Bergen-Belsen and to 
the german military base in Bitburg, in the Federal republic 
of germany, on May 5, 1985 (for documentation, see Hartman, 
1986). Meant to commemorate germany’s redemption as a 
normal nation, the event included victims of the Holocaust, 
but also germany’s fallen soldiers and members of the SS, as 
supposed freedom fighters against communism. The inclusive 
commemoration implied a moral equivalence between the 
SS and the Jews, which would seem to cancel the debt to the 
victims of the Nazis. The event unleashed fury on all sides. in 
liberal and Jewish eyes, it was evidence of anti-Semitism, while 
to german nationalists, it finally recognized their seething 
antipathy to germany’s continuing moral debt, which they 
saw as victimization. Though diminishing, this conflict remains 
today (Niven, 2006).
in the background to the Historikerstreit, two well-established 
historians of germany, Ernst Nolte and andreas Hillgruber, 
provoked controversy and a reply from the philosopher Jürgen 
Habermas. Nolte (1986/1993) claimed that Hitler’s model for 
mass murder was the ‘asiatic deed’ of the russian revolution 
and civil war, a repetition of which against germany he aimed 
to defeat. Hillgruber (1986) made the claim that historical 
methodology required the historian to identify with the object, 
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including german soldiers on the horrific Eastern front. His-
torians of this orientation also claimed that scholarship should 
be free to explore every aspect of the Nazi period, including 
german suffering, and that, by its own progress, historical 
research would work towards settling the differences between 
conflicting views of concerned groups, such as Holocaust sur-
vivors. others, beginning with Habermas, opposed what they 
saw to be a relativizing and dismissal of the Nazi crime, and 
countered it with the moral imperative to remember deeply 
(Eley, 1988; Knowlton & Cates, 1993; for a debate between the 
historians Martin Broszat and Saul Friedländer, see Broszat & 
Friedländer, 1988).
There is, of course, an understandable empathy for ger-
man suffering, but it shades imperceptibly into establishing an 
equivalence of suffering between Jews as a people and germans 
as a people. in isolation from the historical, motivational, and 
moral context, one suffering comes closer to that of another: in 
the de-contextualized extreme, they become identical. For the 
extreme german nationalist, german victimhood endorsed the 
renunciation of any debt to the Jews by literally and concretely 
equating german suffering with the Holocaust (Baranowski, 
2011, pp. 186–187, 202; Bartov, 1998; Bergmann, 1997, p. 27; 
legge, 2003, p. 124; Niven, 2006; Weil, 1997, pp. 114–115). in 
this extreme, the german victim could become a nationalist who 
argued that the Holocaust did not create an enduring claim 
for reparation, and that the time had come to put aside guilt 
for it and for germany to re-join the community of normal na-
tions (Panayi, 2001). Here is Bitburg, taken into public debate.
The Historikerstreit was just one episode in the struggle 
over memory, but it was an epochal moment when the morally 
laden presumptions in historical scholarship were brought into 
an open forum. it was, therefore, a cameo of the conflicted 
memory of the Nazi period. 
in my view, the Historikerstreit is a kind of memorial, perhaps 
concretely located in Bitburg, but then transferred to the virtual 
space of public debate in the press and in collected contribu-
tions (Hartman, 1986; Knowlton & Cates, 1993). it begins as a 
site for remembering, centered on a physical object, a monu-
ment. But, following Noam lupu (2003) and James Young 
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(1993), i differentiate memorials and memorialization from 
monuments. Monuments are material objects, which freeze 
memories, confining them into ideological portrayals; memo-
rials are sites of remembering, often differently, by different 
groups, but around which remembering is alive and ongoing. 
Bitburg was closer to the former, the Historikerstreit to the latter.
Young writes, “instead of allowing the past to rigidify in 
its monumental forms, we would vivify memory through the 
memory-work itself—whereby events, their recollection, and the 
role monuments play in our lives remain animate, never com-
pleted” (1993, p. 15). Perhaps the most profoundly evocative 
memorial sites are the Nazi concentration camps, which have 
been converted into memorial sites in which the monuments 
include the actual structures in the original camps. Young states:
For germans who experienced both the economic boom 
during Hitler’s reich and the destruction of their cities 
during the war, who knew both total military victory and 
unconditional surrender, memory of this time encom-
passes much more than the images of liberated concen-
tration camp prisoners by which the era has so often been 
epitomized in america and England. indeed, the piles 
of corpses in german camps ironically seemed to reflect 
back to many germans their own total devastation, the 
masses of dead in german cities and on the front. at first, 
the german’s only nexus of identification with Jewish 
victims lay in the destruction they now seemed to share, 
not in what they had wrought in Hitler’s name. (p. 56)
at these sites, therefore, there are at least three groups of 
memories: of the Jews, of the germans, and of the american 
and British allies. No doubt, the germans could be divided 
into Nazi supporters, Nazi resisters and bystanders—and by-
standers could be further divided into degrees of complicity 
with the Nazis.
Despite recognizing the groupings of “rememberers” at 
memorials, Young aims to “break down the notion of any memo-
rial’s ‘collective memory’ altogether, and to focus on ‘collected 
memory’, the many discrete memories that are gathered into 
common memorial spaces and assigned common meaning.” He 
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argues that a “society’s memory cannot exist outside of those 
people who do the remembering [and that] individuals cannot 
share another’s memory…They share instead…the meanings 
in memory generated by [the] forms of memory” (p. xi).
i share his view, both that memorials vivify remembering 
while monuments tend to freeze memories into preconceived 
messages, and that individuals cannot in a literal sense share 
memories as specific experiences. His work provides extensive 
documentary material and analyses through which he dem-
onstrates the wish in germany in the decades after 1945 to 
evoke memory-work through memorials, rather than frozen, 
prescriptive messages. i differ with him, however, on two, 
related aspects of his interpretative stance. Firstly, he sets his 
case against “ascribing psychoanalytic terms to the memory of 
groups”; secondly, he rejects the “consequent tendency to see 
all the different kinds of memory in terms of memory-conflict 
and strategies for denial” (p. xi).
on the first point, regarding the idea of collective memory, 
the question as to the applicability of psychoanalytic interpreta-
tion is not whether individuals share a mind, in the sense that 
society as a whole can be viewed as a collective subject or agent. 
rather, the question pertains to the ways in which individu-
als coalesce into imagined unities through group processes. 
Young’s vocabulary points to just such a process of coalescing, 
for example in the phrases “socially constructed” (p. xi), “collec-
tive meaning” (p. xii), “shared experience and destiny” (p. 2), 
“shared memory” (p. 6), “common spaces” (p. 6), the creation 
of a “common past” (p. 6), groups that “become communities 
precisely by having shared (if only vicariously) the experiences 
of their neighbors” (p. 7). The mentality that underlies that 
process presses historians of collective life to include the study 
of memory, itself an established discipline, in their method-
ological repertoire (Kansteiner, 2002). They need explication of 
collective memory, and, i would say, psychoanalytic explication. 
i cannot explore this topic in detail here. (on the idea of com-
munity, see Bohleber [1997].) one need remember only that 
the aim of the Nazis was to eliminate Judaism: a people, not just 
every individual Jew, which was equated with the restoration of 
the german nation, as in Friedländer’s concept of “redemptive 
anti-Semitism” (Friedländer, 1997/2007, pp. 73-112).
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on the second point—avoiding concepts of defence, such 
as denial—i do not think one can do without the idea of a 
socially buttressed exclusion or distortion of memory of the per-
petration of or complicity with events and attitudes that corrupt 
a group’s identity. (i have previously analyzed the postwar divi-
sion of germany as a collective defense against guilt, including 
the literature on groups as defensive organizations [see Figlio, 
2011].) The divergences and conflicts of memory at memorial 
sites bespeak not just differences of memory: they bespeak the 
aim of one version to suppress another, thereby contradicting 
the aim to integrate them into a common memory.
For the historian Charles Maier, “[t]he writing and reading 
of history must rest upon intellectual sociability,” a common 
effort that can overcome ideological partisanship (1988, p. 63). 
He believes that the self-reflection required is equivalent to the 
psychoanalyst’s own analysis. i would add that the psychoana-
lyst’s inquiry into defensive “forgetting” must work together with 
the historian’s investigation of the “multiple restorations” of 
memories (Herf, 1997, pp. 10-11). in Young’s example above, 
the germans who viewed the pile of corpses as an ironic re-
flection on their own devastation, and whose only “nexus of 
identification with Jewish victims lay in the destruction they 
now seemed to share,” were not only drawn to that identifica-
tion more strongly than to their memory of perpetration: they 
used it unconsciously to forget the perpetration. Psychoanalytic 
investigation suggests a defensive forgetting, not just multiple 
memories based on different experiences. Thus, in Katharine 
rothe’s (2009) extensive, psychoanalytically informed explo-
ration of memories from the Nazi period, one interviewee 
reported on having watched a film in the immediate postwar 
period, probably made by the americans, which included a 
“corpse mountain” in a concentration camp. He claimed he 
could detect a fraud in the scenes of apparently Jewish victims, 
in which he saw, in fact, a german corpse mountain from the 
bombing of Hamburg by the allies (pp. 119-144). germans, 
not Jews, were the victims in the war. The detection of fraud 
was a defense, not just another memory.
Similarly, in an extensive study of german memorials of 
expulsion, luppes (2010) argues that the memorials carry a 
423Karl Figlio
political message: that germans were the innocent victims 
of the loss of homeland at the end of the war. He writes of 
an “aesthetics of innocence” and notes the large number of 
monuments that feature women and children as emblems of 
undisputed innocence. He grants that many germans expelled 
from neighbouring territories were innocent, but nonetheless 
he criticizes the de-contextualized presentation of suffering 
from 1945, a suffering imposed on the germans as if an enor-
mity committed against innocence.
We are speaking, not just of forgetting, but of a wish—
unconscious—to forget. as Young states, “[t]o the extent that 
we encourage monuments to do our memory-work for us, we 
become that much more forgetful. in effect, the initial impulse 
to memorialize events like the Holocaust may actually spring 
from an opposite and equal desire to forget them” (1993, p. 
5). and individuals do not forget on their own: they group 
together—coalesce—to forget. Furthermore, in the collective 
act of forgetting, in the very process—in the memorializing—of 
remembering and rebuilding a collective identity, perpetrators 
forget defensively.
Memorials as symbols capture the movement towards and 
away from reconciliation, and they touch raw nerves. They are, 
in particular, seen as evidence of intention. indeed, the more 
innocuous and agreeable the manifest message, the more clues 
are sought to the latent message. They become either the truest 
expression of reconciliation or the most suspect expression of 
malice. in the post-1945 german context, they have been the 
foci of discord in the midst of overt and public dedication to 
overcoming the Nazi blight on collective memory. This discord 
suggests an intense need to uncover the motives that lurk in 
the underground of a culture.
although the historians’ debate may have been of its time 
(Maier, 1988, p. 7), the ambiguity and ambivalence continues. 
This paper will examine the reparative aspect of this ambiva-
lence of memory—commonly called a mastering of the past, a 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung—evidenced in memorials, where the 
ambivalence is still alive (Beattie, 2006; Maier, 1997; Kurthen, 
Bergman, & Erb, 1997). i argue that this joint process of remem-
bering and forgetting can be understood psychoanalytically as 
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reparation and manic reparation, that is, reparation in conflict 
with itself. Thinking of memory as reparation—reviving the 
past through a benign and restorative relationship to it—manic 
reparation embodies the ambiguous, ambivalent, conflicted 
impulse to assert a falsifying, forgetting, or distorting memory 
against restorative memory.
The Ambiguity of Reparation in Memory and Memorials
one of the most moving embodiments of reparation to-
wards the Jews, of universal suffering, and also of the dilution 
of the specific atrocity of the Holocaust, is the sculpture Mother 
with Her Dead Son by Käthe Kollwitz (Fig. 1). it is housed in 
Berlin in the Neue Wache (the New guardhouse) a neo-classical 
building designed by Karl Friedrich Schinkel in 1816 for the 
troops of the Crown Prince of Prussia. Used as a memorial in 
the german Democratic republic, which dedicated it to the 
victims of fascism and militarism, the Neue Wache is now a 
memorial in reunified germany. The Kollwitz statue was placed 
there after unification and re-dedicated, in a ceremony offici-
ated by Chancellor Kohl, to all victims of war.
outside the memorial is a moving dedication of the Neue 
Wache, adapted from a speech by the West german Federal 
President, richard von Weizäcker, on the fortieth anniversary 
of the end of the war. Weizäcker’s speech began:
Today we commemorate in sadness all dead of the war 
and the tyranny.
We remember especially the six million Jews who were 
killed in german concentration camps.
By comparison, the words of the memorial demonstrate the 
conflicted memories lying just beneath the surface of german 
self-consciousness:
The Neue Wache is a place of remembrance and com-
memoration of the victims of war and tyranny.
We remember all nations/peoples who suffered in war.
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For Harold Marcuse, historian of german memorials, there 
should be no simplification either of the complex situation of 
a reunified germany struggling with its past or of the use of 
Kollwitz to represent it:
Kollwitz was a socialist artist, close to the proletariat. 
She was ridiculed by the Nazis…and she is unquestion-
ably one of germany’s greatest artists…She created this 
sculpture in 1937, twenty years [after her son’s death in 
the First World War]. in her diary she wrote: “The mother 
sits and has the dead son lying between her knees. It is no longer 
pain, but reflection.” later she added: it is “a kind of Pietà. 
But the mother is not religious...She is an old, lonely and darkly 
reflecting woman.” (translation of the dedications and diary 
in Marcuse, 1997, n.p., emphasis in original)
Figure 1. Käthe Kollwitz, Mother with Her Dead Son, Neue Wache, Berlin.
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Marcuse continues:
This mother is not displaying the martyred body of her 
dead son, but is enveloping it, taking it back into her 
womb. She is not merely mourning, she is filled with 
regret, with the wish to be able to do it over again differ-
ently…The only appropriate relationship for germans 
to the Nazi past, i think, is sadness and regret. That is 
well expressed by Kollwitz’s sculpture. (n.p., emphasis 
in original)
in Marcuse’s view, symbols themselves do not do the work 
needed to achieve an appropriate relationship to the past. He 
writes, “[if] Helmut Kohl or his successor kisses the ground at 
Yad Vashem [the israeli Holocaust Memorial], as Brandt knelt 
in Warsaw in 1970 [and] [i]f Netanyahu came to the Neue 
Wache afterwards, i would have a more positive assessment of 
the role of symbolic politics in forging a more peaceful world.” 
Memorials do not perform this work of reparation—akin to 
Aufarbeitung or Durcharbeitung rather than Vergangenheitsbewäl-
tigung (mastering the past)—but they recognize the fact of it, 
and sadness and regret are part of reparation.
We might think of the Neue Wache memorial as a sculp-
ture of a collective mind. it portrays humanity and worthy 
memories, but also an avoidance of memories of inhumanity. 
regardless of the intention of the artist, it reflects a hope for 
a unified german future, but also a dissonance in german 
collective consciousness that can be traced from shortly after 
the war and into the present. in 1949, the Christian Democrat 
Konrad adenauer, running for office as the first chancellor of 
the new Federal republic of germany, decided that germany 
could have democracy or memory of the Nazi period, but not 
both. Put bluntly, he would lose if he favored memory (Herf, 
1997, pp. 267-300). in 1950, he demanded of the allies sov-
ereignty for the Federal republic of germany, an apology for 
slandering germany, release of german war criminals, and 
an apology to german soldiers. in 2004, the Central Council 
of Jews suspended participation in the Foundation for Saxon 
Memorial Sites, which administered memorials to the victims 
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of Nazi and Communist persecution, because the foundation 
tended to equate Nazi with Communist crimes (Beattie, 2006, 
p. 147). This reaction has to be seen in the context of discord 
over a motion put to the german parliament by the conserva-
tive CDU, which alleged that insufficient attention was paid to 
Communist tyranny and that there should be commemoration 
of victims of both “totalitarian dictatorships.”
it is not surprising that memorials have stirred intense 
controversy. remembrance includes recognition of an immense 
german suffering, which in andreas Hillgruber’s (1986) ac-
count was an unimaginable, overwhelming experience inflicted 
by the indiscriminate Soviet onslaught on civilians and soldiers 
alike. it also includes accounts of the bombing of Dresden by 
the British and americans. But the denunciation of the allies 
for bombing Dresden began with Nazi propaganda during the 
war and an annual commemoration includes a long-standing 
apologetic line, seeking to mitigate responsibility for Nazi atroci-
ties and to bring the Nazi period into the post-war historical 
narrative without accepting these atrocities (see Niven, 2006). 
Creating images out of context, divorced from the history of 
the Holocaust, Hillgruber (1986) and the nationalist remem-
brance of Dresden (see Fuchs, 2012) serve apologetic aims.
in Dresden, ambivalence at a memorial site stands out 
starkly in the form of an event, the annual commemoration of 
the bombing of Dresden on February 13-14, 1945; a site, the 
Frauenkirche in the town center, along with the Heidefriedhoff 
(Heath Cemetery) on the outskirts of the city; and a monu-
ment, to the victims of the bombing in the Heidefriedhoff. 
Here, polarization is often extreme, so that the nature of the 
ambivalence becomes even clearer. The bombing caused a fire-
storm and completely destroyed the center of the city. There 
are debates about the justification of the attack, which killed 
approximately 25,000 people, many incinerated. in the remain-
ing days of the war, along with the commemoration that has 
continued to gather complex and conflicted motives around 
it ever since, the Nazis added a ‘0’ to this figure and used the 
killing of 250,000 people to accuse the allies of aiming to de-
stroy germany, and in that way shift the charge of atrocity on 
to them (Evans, 2002, pp. 157-192). Every year, thousands of 
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people still gather to remember their loss, an event that, since 
1949, has included a performance of rudolf Mauersberger’s 
Dresdner Requiem in the Frauenkirche. But a requiem, though 
mournful, also elevates the destruction of the city, along with 
the destructiveness of the Nazis, to a spiritual plane, creating 
an ambiguous atmosphere of tragedy. along with mourning 
the victims of Nazi atrocity and allied bombing, the Nazi past 
erupts in an annual neo-Nazi invasion of the commemorations 
redolent of leni riefenstahl’s 1935 Triumph of the Will: “the 
hooded tops with slogans such as Weisse Wille” (the will of 
whites); the banners referring to the ‘bombing holocaust’; or 
indeed the red, white and black flags waved during the Third 
reich” (Pidd, 2012, February 24, p. 25).
The annual commemoration also takes place in the 
Heidefriedhof. Part of the cemetery, redesigned and dedicated 
to those who died in the attack, contains several memorials, 
one of which is a plain, stone, slightly curved wall resting on a 
flagstone base at the end of a long pathway (Fig. 2). one can 
walk towards it from a distance and stand in front of it in silent 
remembrance. a poem by Max Zimmerling—a poet who fled 
both Nazi and Soviet persecution but returned to the gDr—is 
inscribed on the wall. The dedication reads:
How many died? Who knows their number?
in your wounds we can see the agony
of the nameless who here burned 
in hellfire at the hand of man
in memory of the victims
of the air attack on
Dresden 13–14 February 19452
Survivors and their succeeding generations come to this 
memorial, many lay wreaths. The memorial, as well as the city 
of Dresden, has become a memorial shrine. Perhaps it has 
become a memorial site because, along with its being a site 
of mourning, it has gathered conflicted sentiment, beginning 
with anti-allied Nazi and gDr propaganda, then opposition 
from the anti-Nazi peace movement (while the bombing was 
horrific, Dresden did not stand out from many other german 
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cities). Shortly after the end of the war, albums of photographs 
of Dresden and other cities, showing the city before and after 
the war, began to appear. Some of these books, such as Fritz 
löffler’s Das alte Dresden, had extensive and multiple print runs, 
suggesting an intense interest (see Fuchs, 2012; Peter, 1949). 
This genre of “rubble photography” portrayed the utter devas-
tation of Dresden, but in its visual factuality, removed from its 
historical context, it created a trans-historical, nostalgic, forlorn, 
mournful sense of loss. That loss, however, could immediately be 
transformed, through photographs of a reconstructed Dresden, 
into a future in ambiguous relationship with the past. Was loss 
to be continuously re-evoked? Was it to be forgotten, having 
been overcome by progress, as if by magic or by the will of 
the people? Was it to be politicized as part of the anti-Western 
attitude of the socialist gDr? Dresden became, and remains, 
a symbol that condenses motivations that run from the peace 
movement at one extreme to neo-Nazism at the other.
in this ambiguous function the two processes of reparation 
and manic reparation are at work. The public commemora-
tions offer an occasion not only for individual mourning, with 
its base in reparation, but also for a group process, one that 
reinforces nationalism and triumphalism.
The poem on Dresden’s commemorative wall reads, “in 
Figure 2. Heidefriedhof memorial, Dresden.
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your wounds we can see the agony,” using the personal, singu-
lar “your” (An deinen Wunden). The individuals—“who knows 
their number?”—become the mass of “the nameless who here 
burned.” in this mass, the loss of the beautiful city and its 
good people, which included the Jews, is denied, despite the 
overt mourning. The mourned object and mourners merge, 
to be killed, by the allies. The ego’s self-abasing plaint is seen 
in the rubble and in the Dresdener Requiem. in a manic swing, 
Dresdeners, by an unconscious identification with the Nazis, 
triumph over the victims of the Holocaust and of the bombing 
as the demeaned object.
The primitive identification of the mourner with the 
object of mourning and the narcissistic superiority that shows 
through the mourning are mass phenomena. The individual 
citizens become the nameless victims of allied burning, disin-
tegrating into a mass, losing any trace of individuality. We then 
remember that the multitude of people who were first made 
nameless by incineration were the victims of the Holocaust. 
There is no mention of them. We glimpse this distortion of 
mourning as an undercurrent in the substantial gathering of 
right-wing, including neo-Nazi, groups that with their bellowing 
triumphalism invade and try to possess the peaceful, remem-
bering mourners. Through this manic mechanism, they aim 
to make the mourners into a mass object that, now disparaged 
and demeaned, diminishes their loss of the beautiful city-object, 
which included the Jews.
Thousands of people come to the commemorations, many 
with the aim of marginalizing the right-wing groups. in his re-
membrance speech for the victims of the bombing, delivered on 
September 13 , 2011, the city’s deputy mayor Detlef Sittel said:
When we remember them today, we do it in the knowl-
edge of the nights and days in which, previously, War-
saw, rotterdam and Coventry were turned to rubble 
and ash by german bombers…in these hours, 66 years 
ago, the few remaining Dresden Jews were rounded up, 
to be transported to a death camp. in these hours, 66 
years ago, in Dresden, were ever more young germans 
drilled for the war, weapons, [and] instruments of war, 
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grenades, produced…Fanaticism, hate songs and hollow 
slogans shame the memory of the dead…right here, 
at the graves of the victims, we declare: Dresden wants 
reconciliation and Dresden lives reconciliation. (Sittel, 
2011, author’s translation)
The success of mourning and the reparative drive to remem-
ber depend on an ability to manage these memories and the 
guilt that they would evoke. it includes an identification with 
the lost object in which love and the capacity to live together 
predominate.
What i call public mourning and manic reparation gives 
into the ambivalence: the world becomes persecutory, filled with 
retaliatory objects that have to be killed, and killed again, to 
avoid another round of guilt. Such ambivalence is clear in the 
rubble photography. one of these books, Gesang im Feuerofen. 
Köln: Überreste einer deutshen Stadt (Song in the Fire Oven. Cologne: 
Remains of a German City) promulgates a redemptive myth based 
on identifying the german people with the Jews. it asserts ger-
man victimization by equating allied bombing with the Nazi 
attempt to exterminate the Jews, and it appropriates from the 
Jews the invincibility bestowed on them by their god, in their 
emerging from the fiery oven in the old Testament Book 
of Daniel (see Fuchs, 2012). Not only was german suffering 
equated to Jewish suffering: more concretely, the incinerated 
german was the incinerated Jew; the invincible german re-
placed the invincible Jew, taking the envied nature of the Jew 
and eliminating the impurity of the german.
The intrusion into the Dresden commemorations by 
Neo-Nazis aims to turn mourning, with its undercurrent of 
ambivalence, guilt, and reparation, into a call to arms. They 
march with banners that speak of never forgetting, but it is the 
triumphalism of the manic position that is not, for them, to be 
forgotten. Their narcissistic zeal does not mourn lost lives, cit-
ies, and pride, nor aim for reparation, but instead brings back 
the nationalistic superiority of the Nazis. With commemoration 
comes the inclination either to find a way to live with the past 
in mourning and reparation or to succumb to a manic avoid-
ance that resembles mourning and reparation but remains 
triumphal over them.
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Reparation and Identification
in the decades after 1945, remembering in germany has 
reflected an acute sensitivity about the intentions behind sym-
bols of reparation. in particular, this sensitivity has stemmed 
from ambivalence and from an undercurrent of anti-reparative 
feeling beneath the dedicated reparative aim towards the Jews. 
reparation—in contrast to manic reparation, which is a form 
of evasion of reparation—derives from the guilt-driven urge to 
repair the good object (see Hinshelwood, 1991, pp. 412–416; 
Klein, 1937/1992, pp. 311–313; Klein, 1940/1992, pp. 348–349). 
reparative thinking is premised on the idea of the existence of 
an internal world, in which a relationship is formed between 
oneself and an object of concern. i say “internal” world, to 
convey this idea that an other has come into one’s sphere in 
such a way as to stir a feeling of responsibility—and associated 
guilt—towards it.
reparation is not accountability in a juridical sense but 
acceptance of responsibility in psychic reality. it is an aspect 
of the “depressive position,” an internal psychic moment in 
which an internal good object is experienced as damaged by 
the ego and in which “depressive anxiety” at the state of the 
object arouses an urge to repair it (see Klein, 1935/1992; 
Klein, 1940/1992; Hinshelwood, 1991, pp. 138–155). guilt 
is intrinsic to reparation. The object remains blemished and 
can never again be as it was, so the reparative process remains 
incomplete. Sadness at the loss of the object and remorse at 
the attack upon it engrave themselves into the psyche. one 
might say that the object eventually is found to be good, as a 
discovery rather than as an achievement—something we notice 
when we stand back and attend to what has happened, and is 
likely to happen, to the object. i think that this state of “found 
to be good” is a form of Klein’s idea of gratitude (1957/1992) 
and that hope is an appropriate word for an anticipation of it 
(Hinshelwood, 2007, p. 202).
This understanding can be applied at the social level, 
without having to assume that society is a subject or agent 
and therefore acts in such a way as to cause it to feel guilty. 
in psychic reality, as it appears in the clinical process, guilt 
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evokes reparation. Evidence of reparative intention is there-
fore also evidence of guilt. Similarly, a national purposiveness 
in reparative activity gives evidence of national guilt and also 
of the urge to recover a convergent memory from the shards 
and distortions of memory. Political accounts of this repara-
tive activity are needed to understand post-1945 germany, but 
such accounts also require the language of perpetration, guilt, 
defense, and reparation.
What is the object and motive of reparation? C. Fred al-
ford (2006) aims to show that there is an ethical imperative at 
the root of reparation (see also Vetlesen, 2005, pp. 104–144). 
alford argues for a “reparative natural law” that would pro-
vide a foundation for a natural law of ethics and that would 
be incomplete if it did not garner an ethical commitment to 
the actual victims of unethical behaviour. Without the honing 
of commitment by generations of social life, it would remain 
an abstract force that could as well drive an aesthetic, even 
narcissistic, preoccupation as inspire a concern to improve the 
situation of people who suffer.
i agree that one needs to distinguish between concern for 
the object and the narcissism of feeling good, but i will stress 
here the importance of internal objects in relation to external 
objects. The commitment of successive german governments 
to make good the damage inflicted in the Nazi period provides 
an example of embedding a reparative attitude into social life. 
Nonetheless, reparation takes its own path, and does not easily 
translate into action. reparation is based on an identification 
between ego and object, perpetrator and victim, which is rooted 
in depressive concern for the object. More loving than doing, 
making the object better involves making the ego-perpetrator 
better (a topic intensively explored by Schwab [2010]). Ego 
and object impart beneficence to each other. By contrast, 
narcissistic identification is not properly an identification, but 
swells up with pride, while secretly denigrating the object. in 
that sense it is manic.
Clinical psychoanalysis examines the details of the repara-
tive process, offering thereby perhaps the deepest insight into its 
nature. as an example, i choose the following clinical vignette 
published by the French psychoanalyst Haydee Faimberg (2005) 
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from the case of an intergenerational transmission of trauma, 
in this instance passed from a father during the Nazi period to 
his son, in analysis with Faimberg. i have condensed the nar-
rative of a session into a diagram of the reparative process in 
relation to identification (Fig. 3). The interpretation is mine.3
The analysand, Mario, seemed almost lifeless for some 
time in his analysis. in the background was his father, a Pol-
ish refugee (presumably from the Nazis) in argentina. Father 
had sent money during the war to support his natal family in 
Poland, but to no avail, the implication being that they had 
perished. Now, in his analysis, Mario speaks of (re)discovering 
that his mother had a sister who had been “forgotten” and left 
in a mental hospital:
i asked my mother about auntie rita. [Mother] was quite 
surprised at my knowing of her existence and asked me 
how i knew about her. i remembered her. i don’t know 
if i had always remembered her, but in the last few years 
i realized i knew about her. My mother told me that 
rita was confined to a psychiatric hospital. i asked her 
how long ago had she been sent there and she told me 
it had happened when she (my mother) was expecting 
my brother. i was five at the time. My mother never went 
to see my aunt and never talked about her…i found out 
where she was and i asked my brother, who is a doctor, 
to see if she was well taken care of. i have been visiting 
her, telling her all that has happened in the twenty-five 
years she has been isolated from the world. i’ve taught 
her to wash [he said, pointing to his own shoes that for 
the first time looked clean] and i’ve set myself as an 
example. (Faimberg, 2005, pp. 13–14)
Note the background: the patient’s father, as his father’s son, 
tried to make his father and father’s family better, a reparative 
task unconsciously taken on by Mario as his own son. Mario 
brings his aunt into his memory. His mother and her sister 
together represent a mother who had lost her memory and her 
self-esteem. in getting in touch with his aunt, then, Mario brings 
his aunt as mother and himself as son together. Furthermore, 
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“son” is divided between himself and his brother, a doctor 
who is enlisted to make mother better. in bringing “mother” 
and “son” back together, mother’s memory is also restored. it 
is a reparative scenario, in which mother—the patient’s good 
internal object—is looked after, made better. in his repeated 
references to her, she was remembered, and the making better, 
including being remembered, restores the mother’s internal 
world, repairing her self-esteem and her missing memory.
The reparative process in this case was based on iden-
tifications. in the beginning of the analysis, the patient was 
almost lifeless, but he remembered his aunt, got in touch 
with her and in the process not only came alive himself but 
also brought her, as “mother,” alive. Sent to a mental hospital 
during mother’s pregnancy, his aunt had been destroyed as a 
mother. The mother’s pregnancy had been attacked—a primal 
attack on her reproductive capacity. The two sons, together, 
Figure 3. Diagram based on Faimberg (2005).
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represent her son, in both a doing mode (the doctor) and a 
loving mode (the patient): “he” as son draws her as mother into 
identification with “his” restorative character. guilt for the at-
tack on maternal reproductive capacity drives the reparation. 
Stated in a condensed formulation, a son-ego felt impelled 
to repair a damaged-mother-object and the means of repara-
tion became identification between a getting-better ego and a 
getting-better object.
in this form of identification—introjective identification—
the ego and object are brought together, each enriched by 
the process. By contrast, in projective identification, the ego 
intrudes a part of itself into the object, both to control the 
object through this part-ego and to evacuate this part-ego from 
the ego. Klein offers a clinical example; a patient reported the 
following dream:
He was in an upstairs flat and “X”, a friend of his, was 
calling him from the street suggesting a walk together…
The patient did not join “X”, because a black dog in the 
flat might get out and be run over. He stroked the dog. 
When he looked out of the window, he found that “X” 
had receded. (Klein, 1957/1992, p. 227)4
in Klein’s interpretation, the friend, X, is a part of the patient, 
an aggressive part that recedes from him. X takes with him the 
patient’s aggressive danger to the dog-analyst, who must be 
protected, stroked, by the ego that stays behind in the flat. The 
patient’s aggression is managed by projective identification into 
X; that is, X is identified with, and controlled by, the part-ego 
that has been projected into him, forming a part-ego-object 
unit under part-ego control, which is moved into the distance, 
carrying the ego’s aggression with it. The bulk of the ego, now 
freed of aggression, protects the dog-analyst.
in this case, the menace to the ego was the aggression 
that would target the object, evoking guilt and a depressive 
reaction in the ego. This patient’s concern for the analyst was 
near the surface. The scenario approaches a wish for reconcili-
ation between the ego and object and between the ego and its 
aggressiveness. Here, introjective identification holds ego and 
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object, as well as aggression, together, in that the patient can 
represent the situation to himself in the internal scene of the 
dream. in other cases, however, hatred seethes self-destructively 
inside the ego. in such instances, projective identification, rein-
forced by an annihilating attack on the part-ego-object aims at 
extinguishing the hated aspect. The attack on the object saves 
the perpetrator, something that happens in the manic phase 
of manic-depression or in murder as an unconscious alterna-
tive to suicide (Williams, 1998, pp. 41–51). in virulent cases, 
the object of projective identification must be annihilated in 
order to eliminate the internal aggression that otherwise could 
overwhelm the ego.
Conclusion: Manic Reparation and the Ambivalence in 
Memorials
We can align introjective and projective identification with 
reparation and manic reparation, respectively. reparation is 
driven by concern for the good object, guilt at its damage, and 
the urge to restore it by introjective—that is, inclusive—identi-
fication with the good ego. it reflects the hope that the good 
object might be restored. By contrast, manic reparation, as 
described by Hannah Segal (1981, pp. 147–158), aims to keep 
the object of reparation under control and idealizes the “repair-
ing” agent. Projective identification, that is, an identification 
between the part-ego and the object, alienated from the main 
ego, drives it psychologically. Belief in magical restoration of 
the object—the other side of magical control over its life and 
death—evidences the narcissistic grandeur of the main ego 
and its contempt for the object.  This belief recalls the Nazi 
pairing of redemption of the german nation with the debase-
ment and annihilation of the Jewish people and culture (see 
Friedländer, 1997/2007, pp. 73–112).5
Memorials that symbolize reparative intentions can also 
be sites of tension between reparative, introjective assimilation 
of a past of perpetration and a manic-reparative, projective 
identification with “enemies,” including, in the german case, 
Jews, capitalists and communists—indeed, Jews as capitalists 
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and communists (Friedländer, 1997/2007, pp. 91–95, 178, 180-
189, 310–311). Making-good in post-war germany has included 
nationalism and magical restoration, which has infiltrated the 
reparative urges towards the damaged object. Thus the Frg’s 
economic miracle was not only a material success but also a 
magical creation of a new history. Sebald (2003), who repro-
duced rubble photographs from the period, felt troubled by 
people who seemed out of touch with the horror, offering bland 
accounts of everyday postwar life or seeing in the devastated 
cityscapes the dawn of a new age. in psychoanalytic language, 
they appeared manic in their denial of destruction and in their 
phantasy of magical restoration.
in the case of manic reparation, the ego fears annihila-
tion with any relaxing of control over the object, whereas with 
reparation, the ego and the object dwell together in gratitude. 
The Jew in the german mind has thus oscillated between 
polar opposites: on the one hand, the Jew as an encroaching 
internal object, firing a demand that german victimhood by 
the aggression of the Jews and the allies be recognized and 
accepted as equivalent to Jewish victimhood, and on the other, 
the Jew as a fully german citizen, the recipient of an earnest 
public commitment to reparation.
These two forms of identification are alloyed in memori-
als, experienced particularly in the sensitivity over memorials 
that embrace all victims of war. at a conscious level, it seems 
grudging not to commemorate all victims of war: memorials 
imply an (introjective) identification among sufferers, and with 
it, an emotional kinship that is the root of understanding and 
reconciliation. But the perpetrator can disappear, as in the 
adaptation of Weizäcker’s 1985 speech for the Neue Wache 
memorial. “We remember especially the six million Jews who 
were killed in german concentration camps” became “We 
remember all nations/peoples who suffered in war.” Equat-
ing suffering german soldiers with suffering Jews evades the 
guilt of the perpetrator of the Holocaust. The perpetrator 
has become invisible, arousing an uncanny sense that it is still 
stalking somewhere.
in psychoanalytic language, what underlies the sensitiv-
ity over memorials and memory in general is that reparative 
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behavior becomes infiltrated with a manic-reparative intention 
that retains nationalistic fervor and “redemptive anti-Semitism.” 
Perceived external reality is infused with internal reality; in par-
ticular, with a primitive form of object relations, in which ger-
man perpetration disappears into german suffering through a 
concrete equation with Jewish suffering. Even “suffering” is too 
complex a term: the piles of corpses in photographs become 
at the same time Jews and germans, a concrete identity that 
Hannah Segal called a “symbolic equation” (1981, pp. 49-68). 
The dead, nameless Jew in such an equation becomes not 
only the dead german but also the living german, magically 
restored from the identity with the dead Jew. 6 This kind of so-
called reparation stalks authentic reparation.
This difference in mode of identification—introjective 
or projective—drives remembering and reparation towards 
either convergent memory rooted in objectifying debate and 
reparation, or towards evasive, illusory, partisan memory and 
manic reparation. one can understand the need for nations 
to construct “good” memories, but they have to come from 
a truthfulness in line with introjective identification—an ego 
enriched by its objects while restoring those objects. renova-
tion built on magical restoration—built on the rubble of a 
denigrated object—is, in psychoanalytic terms, a manic defense. 
it comprises a phantasied omnipotence, surrounded in a glow 
of self-idealization and rooted in the agent’s contempt for the 
object of its manipulation. The capacity to sustain such an il-
lusory world may be grounded in horrific acts that “prove” its 
omnipotence and in the subtle subterfuge of distorted memory.
The psychoanalytic distinction between reparation and 
manic reparation refers to a fundamental differentiation be-
tween states of mind that can, at the descriptive level, seem 
the same. in reparation, the ego and the object get better, in 
introjective identification. in manic reparation, the superior-
ity of the ego over the object is retained as an illusion, along 
with the withdrawal from ordinary memory and history. Such 
illusory superiority becomes sensitive to the smallest challenge: 
any divergence from illusion represents not just interference 
from actual, perceptual reality but a deflation of narcissism. 
Memorials as sites of reparation, where memory could be 
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healed, fracture when claimed by groups in conflict with each 
other, some with triumphalism in mind rather than reparative 
intent. The preservation of narcissism in manic reparation, from 
which the slightest deviation is a catastrophic collapse, demands 
a cut-off, a termination, in the futile wish to keep the ideal by 
cutting off the object of reparation, which constantly exposes a 
false ideal. reparation has no endpoint, no moment to declare, 
“That is enough.” indeed, the question of “when is it enough” 
betrays the intention to have done with reparative memory in 
an absolute sense and signals the manic solution of projective 
identification as the means of purifying the national ego.
Notes
1. See Klein (1937/1992, pp. 311–313; 1940/1992, pp. 348–349) and Segal (1981, 
pp. 147–158).
2. This poem has various translations, and i have modified them, but they do not 
capture the rhythm and power of the german original:
Wieviele starben? Wer kennt die Zahl?
an deinen Wunden sieht man die Qual
der namelosen, die hier verbrannt
im Höllen feuer aus Menschenhand
3. For a fuller interpretation, together with interpretations by other authors, see 
Figlio (2012).
4. For further discussion of this example, see Hinshelwood (1994, p. 125).
5. although Klein stressed the aggressiveness of projective identification, she also 
spoke of projection of good parts of the ego (1946/1992). it is not usual to align 
introjective identification with an enrichment of the ego through a healthy, loving 
assimilation of the object, and projective identification with the hating expulsion 
of destructive parts of the ego into the object, which becomes the “bad ego.” 
it is also not usual to base reparation on introjective identification and manic 
reparation on projective identification. i cannot argue the theoretical case here, 
but only suggest that assimilation and reparation are loving, and expulsion and 
manic reparation as triumph over the object are hating. it tallies with Freud’s 
original formulation, in which the ego takes in what is good and makes it part of 
the ego, and expels what is bad and makes it into the alien object world. intro-
jective identification/reparation brings the ego and object together; projective 
identification/manic reparation keeps them separate, and asserts the superiority 
of the ego over the denigrated object, as in Freud’s account of a manic state 
(Freud, 1917 [1915], p. 257). in the former, the ego, in its “getting-better” state, 
recognizes goodness in the object; in the latter, the ego feels good because it has 
intruded its disphoria into the object. any goodness in the object incites envy 
and prolongs a grudge.
6. The more primitive and concrete the object relations, the more “akin” or “sim-
ilar” or “equivalent” become “identical.” The more that is the case, the more 
the suffering of the fourteen million germans who were expelled from their 
homes after the Second World War become identical to german soldiers killed 
in action, and they, in turn become identical to the fallen SS at Bitburg, and 
they become identical to all expelled people; and they all become identical to 
the Jews who were murdered in death camps. Paradoxically, Jews are capitalists 
and communists. The more the differences are elided, the more a perpetrator 
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is on the loose and the more the Jews themselves become the perpetrators (See 
also Herf, 2006). in this paranoid world of primitive object relations, the ego is 
always in danger of annihilation, as it lives in an illusion that it can invincibly 
annihilate all enemies.
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